DePaul Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 2 Winter 1968

Article 7

Shared-Time - Permissible Aid to Sectarian Education
Alan Sobel

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
Alan Sobel, Shared-Time - Permissible Aid to Sectarian Education, 17 DePaul L. Rev. 373 (1968)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol17/iss2/7

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

1968]

COMMENTS
CONCLUSION

It is probable that in the near future, an attorney will be called upon to
defend a client who has committed a crime while under the influence of
an hallucinogen, such as LSD. This probability will increase with the expanding use of the drug. As LSD affects the natural functioning of the mind, the
raising of a defense of a lack of criminal responsibility appears to be the most
likely approach to be taken by the attorney. Through the introduction of expert medical testimony it can be shown that the LSD reaction is so analogous
to that caused by alcohol and narcotics or to insanity that the legal consequences of these areas must be held applicable to hallucinogens.
Philip Wolin

SHARED-TIME-PERMISSIBLE AID TO SECTARIAN EDUCATION
Several years ago, as a result of financial pressures on sectarian high
schools, or perhaps as a means to broaden public education, the City of
Chicago proposed a shared-time program to be initiated in the Chicago
school system on an experimental basis.' The proposed experiment would
take place at the Kennedy High School in conjunction with St. Paul's Roman
Catholic High School. The program was adopted by a resolution of the
Chicago Board of Education in April, 1964 and implemented by a report of
the General Superintendent of Public Schools one year later. The Chicago
experiment on shared-time is significant, not only in its unusual operational
features,2 but in that it may be the solution to the recurring source of
controversy throughout the past century involving types of permissible aid
to church-related institutions as it pertains to secondary education. 8 In the
past, if a private or sectarian school could not fund its operations on a fulltime basis independent of public aid, it would have to close its doors. With
a shared-time program in effect, some of the burden would be taken off the
private school by having its students attend some of their classes at a public
I Report

on Shared Time by Benjamin C. Willis, former Superintendent of Chicago

Public Schools, to the Chicago Board of Education, Feb. 28, 1964.
2
See Flynn, Hope or Chaos for the Schools?, 53 ILL. EDUC. Ass'N 125, 127 (1964),
where the author notes that two hundred and eighty school district superintendents
"said they were operating shared time programs. In addition, one hundred and eleven
said they were considering such programs."
8 DRINAx, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 165 (1st ed. 1963). For historical
development see Comment, Governmental Aid to Church-Related College-Side-Stepping
the "Wall of Separation," 16 DEPAuL L. REv. 409 (1967).
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school, thereby reducing the private school's cost of operation. But since the
establishment clause of the first amendment 4 has become a viable doctrine,5
the problem of any public aid to sectarian schools on a secondary level involves constitutional ramifications. This paper will attempt to examine the
constitutional problems raised by a shared-time program and its permissibility.
DESCRIPTION

OF SHARED-TIME

At this point, it will be useful to have a definition and description of
shared-time (dual-enrollment) as an analytical matter. For this purpose,
Mr. Francais Keppel's interpretation in an address given to the House
Committee on Education and Labor is adequate:
Under the concept of dual-enrollment, a mutual agreement is reached between
public school and private school officials wherein a child takes part of his school
work in the public school and part in the private school. When in the public school,
the child is a public school pupil, his instruction is by public school teachers, and he
is under the supervision of public officials just as any other child enrolled in public
school. When in private school, the child is, of course, under the supervision of those
in charge of the private school. This concept of dual-enrollment differs from released time or dismissed time in that under these programs a child received all of
his secular education in the public school but is excused during the school day to
attend classes in religious education held off public property and financed entirely
by private funds.6
In the Chicago experimental program, the subject courses taken in the
public school by students who also attend St. Paul's High School are the nonvalue or neutral subjects. 7 Specifically, this includes the sciences, mathematics, laboratory courses, industrial arts and physical education. At St.
Paul's High School the shared-time students take, under religious auspices,
English, social studies, music and art. Grading and promotion of parochial
students in the public school is determined by the public school, and credit
towards a Chicago Public High School diploma is given for the courses which
are taken at both schools. The costs of communication between the public
and parochial school are financed by the latter. In this particular program
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... "
5 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
6 Statement by Francais Kepple, Commissioner of Education, before House Committee
on Education and Labor, Feb. 28, 1964.
7 The designation of "neutral" or "non-value" in education courses is generally understood to mean that a course is not subject to social, religious or ethical interpretation;
which generally include the physical sciences. In contradistinction, the "value" or "non-

neutral" courses are subject to interpretation and generally partake of the humanities,
social science and religion.
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bus service is not provided due to the proximity of the two schools. Participation in the program may be effected only upon application in writing by the
student's parents or legal guardians and the participating students must
comply with the compulsory school attendance laws of Illinois. s The students
from the parochial school are fully integrated into the public school classes,
and the scheduling of classes is made by the public school, with the parochial
school accommodating its schedule accordingly to satisfy its requirements.
The students who are exclusively enrolled in the public school receive a
complete education there, including all the courses which the shared-time
students receive in the participating private or sectarian school. At no time
is there a stoppage or suspension of the daily schedule of classes at the
public school to accommodate the shared-time students.
SHARED-TIME AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

There may be a question whether the Chicago shared-time program, or any
notion of dual-enrollment, suffers from constitutional infirmities in its
analytical and operational nature. The dispositive question would be couched
in the principle of separation of church and state: Does shared-time constitute an "establishment of religion" in violation of the first amendment which
has been made applicable upon the states by reason of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment?' The controlling issue to be considered is:
Does shared-time constitute direct aid to religious institutions by means of
public monies producing vast savings to the church at the expense of general
taxpayers and existing solely for the purpose of maintaining parochial school
systems? If the affirmative of the issue is concluded, the initiation of a
shared-time program would constitute an "establishment of religion" and
thus be unconstitutional. It is opined, however, that such is not the case and
that shared-time will not fall prey to the invigilating eye of the United States
Supreme Court.
The establishment clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
mean at least: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can . . . pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over
another.... No tax, in any amount, large or small can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions."'1 The first amendment certainly
reflects the notion that the church and state should be separated, and the
separation must be complete and unequivocal where an interference with
8

ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 26-1, 26-2 (1963).

9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law .... "
10 Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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the free exercise of religion or an establishment of religion is concerned.
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State. . . .Otherwise the state
and religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."" It is not necessary to point out the long history of church-state
de facto cooperation and association; this point has been well developed
12
in the much publicized Zorach case.
Cases have indicated that not all aid or cooperation with religion is
proscribed by the Constitution. In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of
8
Education1
and Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education,'4 it was held
that states may provide textbooks for both public and parochial schools
where the text books are of a secular nature. In Shuey v. Lebanon County,1
it was held that the inclusion of a chapel in a county home where the
indigent and non-ambulatory guests may worship, if they desire, is constitutional. No violation of the Constitution was found in St. Patrick's Church
Society of Corning v. Heermans16 where water was furnished free of cost to
school houses, including parochial school houses. In Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Twp. 17 the Supreme Court found that providing bus
transportation to all school pupils, sectarian and public, did not constitute an
aid to religion. The similarity in these cases is that the function which was
aided was something other than religion. The benefit which was conferred
was directed either to education generally or to the welfare of the pupil. With
shared-time, no aid is given directly to the Catholic Church or to any other
institution, secular or sectarian. The public monies which are expended go
directly to the public school and the legislative purpose is wholly secular-to
provide a good common education. The benefit is conferred directly upon the
pupil and is secular in nature; therefore, any savings or benefit to the sectarian institution is incidental and would seem to be permissible aid. The
determination of the constitutionality of shared-time, therefore, pivots not
merely upon showing that religion is indeed aided, but rather that the
form of aid is either permitted or disallowed.
The courts recognize that public monies may not be used to pay tuitions at
sectarian schools' 8 and that government may not use its authority in the
11

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
'2 1d. at 312-13.
13 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
14 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).

15 10 Lebanon 84 (Pa. Com. P1. 1964).
16 124 N.Y.S. 705, 68 Misc. 487 (1910).
17

Supra note 10.

i 8 Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 430, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).

"It compels taxpayers to
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field of education in order to instruct children in religion generally or in
any specific religion.' 9 If it is assumed that the principal reason for the
existence of a sectarian school is to provide for religious teaching and the
practice of religion, and that religious considerations are intertwined in the
entire fabric of sectarian education, then monies raised by taxation cannot
be used to support such education. It follows that direct grants or aids to
sectarian schools are prohibited support. But, as seen in shared-time, no tax
monies per se will go to the parochial or private schools.
Increased enrollment in certain subject courses at the participating public
school will probably necessitate expanded facilities which will in turn require
an increased amount of spending for the local board of education. However,
the fact that the added enrollment in the public school results in an increased
cost of operation is irrelevant. Parents are free to send their children to a
private school as they may assume the costs of private dancing, elocution, or
music lessons. Public funds cannot be used for these private purposes. But
if students of private schools choose to have their education supplemented
by the public schools, they certainly are entitled to such privilege because the
public schools must stand open to all pupils in the community. In view of
the fact that it is the public school which is the exclusive recipient of the
permissible public expenditure, it cannot be said that the aid to any sectarian
institution is direct.
The test to be applied should be: Is the benefit related to the aiding of the
religious aspects of the institution? The best example of prohibited benefits
would be "across the board" aid to a sectarian school because of the close
relation to the religious function. Such aid is plainly prohibited as no separation is even attempted. Aids such as milk, lunch, medical inspection and
services do not raise a substantial problem as they are not closely related to
the religious function served.2 0 Transportation 2' and textbooks (where the
textbooks are common to the secular and sectarian educational systems)
also fall into the same category.22 Aid might also be extended to some equippurposes totally unconnected with the
ment or facilities designed for special
23
schools.
the
of
functions
religious
In the area of shared-time, it would take obtuse reasoning to find that
contribute money for the propagation of religious opinions which they may or may not
believe."
19 See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
20
21

See PFEFmR, CHURCH,
Supra note 10.

STATE AND FREEDOM

22 Supra note 13.

23 Comment, supra note 3.

474-75 (1953).
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the aid given to the parochial school students in the form of secular education on a part-time basis is directly related to the religious function. Certainly
there could be no denial by any participating sectarian institution that
shared-time would result in vast savings to it by reducing operational costs,
for that is the most attractive feature of shared-time. But shared-time aid
goes directly to the public school and manifests itself in the form of a
necessary public service-secular education. The benefit accrues primarily
and solely to the pupil and any advantages bestowed upon the sectarian
institution is but incidental and in no way is its religious function aided. The
Supreme Court has stated:
Of course, cutting off church schools from . . . services, so separate and so in-

disputably marked off from the religious function, would make it far more difficult
for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment. The Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its elections with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than
24
it is to favor them.
It may be claimed that the sole purpose for the creation of shared-time
programs is to perpetuate the parochial school system; if so, then in order
to withstand the strictures of the establishment clause, there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect which neither advances
nor inhibits religion.2 5 One may conjecture that in the Chicago shared-time
experiment, consideration of the financial status of the Catholic Church was
highly instrumental in initiating the program because a vast majority of the
private high schools in Chicago are maintained by the Roman Catholic
Church. 26 The problem which confronts the Church is their financial inability
to provide for a complete education, equivalent to the public school in
quality. "Massive spending solely for public schools would in time result in
a critical weakening of church related schools, presaging the ultimate closing
of many of them."'27 Certainly, few would deny that education falls within
the proper sphere of public welfare legislation. "It is much too late to argue
that legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a
24 Supra note 10, at 18.
25 See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, supra note 19; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., supra note 10.
26 Editorial, Religion and American Public Schools, 9 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE
5, 14 (1967), wherein it was observed that "92% of all private school pupils are enrolled
in Catholic parochial schools . . . which in 1966 had 42% of the Catholic children enrolled."
27 Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference, The Constitutionality of
the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education, reprinted in 50
GEo. L.J. 397, 438 (1961).
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secular education serves no public purpose. ' 28 The service being provided
to the shared-time students is education of a secular nature, totally unrelated
to the religious function. It is not, therefore, the teaching of religion nor
its inculcation that is being publicly supported, but rather the general education of the high school pupil. At best the sectarian school is the recipient
of an incidental side benefit manifesting itself in the form of financial alleviation of a burden voluntarily assumed. The Supreme Court has always held
that incidental side benefits to private parties or religion do not invalidate
a law so long as a public purpose is sought and served,2 and the education
of children in science, mathematics and the like involves a public purpose.
It may also be posited that the primary purpose and effect of shared-time
is to aid the parochial school student in securing religious training. The
predication of this claim would be based upon the premise that the financial
relief given by alleviating the load of the parochial school enables it to
continue in its function where, without such aid, it might have to close or
compromise its educational program. The inarticulated premise is that the
function of a church-related school is religious training. Indeed, the major
premise to this syllogism is probably true, but the conclusion is erroneous.
The primary purpose and effect of shared-time is to enable the pupil to get
a good secular education, and while the program may enhance the financial
posture of the church-oriented school by allowing it to concentrate its funds
on courses steeped in religious dimensions, this is only an incidental benefit.8 0
Another possible objection to shared-time may arise in its operational nature. While it is incumbent upon the sectarian school to adjust its scheduling
to be compatible with the public school, some revisions in the scheduling of
classes and functions in the public school is inevitable. Would such concessions to the sectarian school constitute a form of prohibited "aid"? If the
public schools were never to make concessions to religion, or display some
28 Supra note 10, at 7.
29 330 U.S. 1 (1947). "The fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an
inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the public
need." Id. at 6. "Consequently it [the state] cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-Believers, Presbyterians, or
the members of any other faith, because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the
benefits of public welfare legislation ....
" Id. at 16. See also McGowan v. Maryland,
supra note 25.
30 Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114 (1955). The case involved a
proposed New Hampshire law which would have provided annual grants-in-aid to
hospitals in the state offering nurses' training. The aid would have gone only to charitable
hospitals, including sectarian ones which did not discriminate on the basis of the religion
of either students or patients. The court held that the grant program did not violate
the first amendment. "If some denomination incidentally derives a benefit through the
release of other funds for other uses, this result is immaterial." Id. at 522, 113 A.2d at
116.
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recognition of the role religion plays in our pluralistic culture, it would indeed
give the student a distorted view of American society. Generally, if the public
schools did not acknowledge the relationship of our religious nature to individual and community life, the public schools would indeed be hostile to the
religion. This point was recognized in the Zorach case when the court stated:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being ...
We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any
one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the
appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian
needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature
of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. 31
The constitutional status of dual-enrollment is not altogether without
precedent. In 1911, a case of a similar nature was decided in the Pennsylvania
courts.12 Catholic students attending a parochial school requested admission

in a manual training program offered in the public school and were refused.
The trial court in upholding the student's right to attend the public school
stated that there was no benefit bestowed on the sectarian school by admitting
the parochial school students into the public school on a part-time basis. On
appeal to the state's highest court, the ruling was upheld and in a four to one
opinion the court declared:
[T]he benefits and advantage of these additional schools as means of education and
improvement are not restricted to the pupils in regular attendance at the elementary
public schools.., but are intended to be free to all persons residing in such District,
subject, of course, to reasonable rules and regulations consistent with the spirit of
the school laws and the necessity for their effective and orderly administration. 33
In a 1943 Washington case, Justice Mallery, in a dissenting opinion, observed:
But certainly no inhibitions can be found in . . . [the] federal constitution that

would prevent a pupil, in accordance with a legislative enactment, from being a
part-time pupil attending the day school . . . and taking fewer courses than the

entire high school curriculum; or enjoying equally, with every other pupil, any one
or more of the facilities of the public school, which continue to remain a part of
the public school entity, without any qualification of exclusive enrollment or the
forbearance of private or parachial school attendance.3 4
81 Supra note 11, at 313-14.
82 Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v. Plummer, 21 Pa. Dist. 182 (1911).
33 Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v. School Dist. of Altoona, 241 Pa. 224, 229 (1913).
34 Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201, 135 P.2d 79, 88 (Wash. 1943).

1968]

COMMENTS

It may be inquired whether shared-time does serve a public purpose as
it could have the tendency of weakening the control of the public schools
because it possibly will enhance private school enrollment. Indeed, even if
the result of permitting shared-time would lead to every pupil in the public
schools attending private schools on a part-time basis, it is difficult to see
where it would necessarily lead to a substantive evil. Shared-time recognizes
religious diversity while playing down unnecessary divisiveness. It allows
the neutral (public) school to concentrate on academic excellence in most
subjects while allowing the religious school to provide the added dimensions
of religious insight. Shared-time might, in fact, strengthen the public schools
85
as it would result in the return of many children to it.
Shared-time can be viewed as a permissible aid to sectarian education in
that it does not fall under the constitutional infirmities of the program indicated in McCullom v. Board of Education.86 Upon examination, it will be
found that the objectional features in the McCullom case do not appear in
shared-time. Under shared-time, the public school takes no part in selecting or
approving religious instruction and no pupil is displaced who is not involved
in the sectarian aspects of the program. The operations of the public school
are not suspended to accommodate religious instruction and the burden of
the expense of communication between schools is not upon the public school.
Indeed, if any similarity is to be found, it is to the released time program as
ruled upon in Zorach v. Clauson.8 7 However, it is distinguishable from Zorach
in that the public school is not required to virtually suspend its operations
while the students participating in the shared-time arrangement supplement
their education elsewhere. If anything, there is even less cooperation between
church and state in shared-time. It would appear difficult then, to see a constitutional distinction between shared-time and the constitutionally upheld
released time program in Zorach since this "problem like many problems in
88
constitutional law, is one of degree."
88See supra note 27, at 443-44, for statistics on elementary and secondary school
enrollment in the United States. Compare total enrollment with Catholic school enrollment.
36 McCullom v Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The McCullom case involved
a program whereby, during the daily school schedule, classes were conducted in religion
by various religious leaders in the community who were approved by the Board of Education. The classes were conducted in the public school classrooms and those students
not desiring to participate in the classes would remain in the halls.
87 The Zorach case, supra note 11, involved a released time program whereby some
students were released once a week before the end of the regular school day to attend
classes in religion at a sectarian institution. Those students who did not participate
remained in the public school until the end of the regular school day. Prior to the
Zorach case, released time was held not violative of the United States Constitution and
the Illinois Constitution. See People ex rel. Latimer v. Chicago Board of Educ., 394 IlM.
228, 68 N.E.2d 305 (1946).
8sSupra note 11, at 314.
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Where a state constitutional provision requires a system of free schools
whereby all children of that state may receive a good common school education,3 9 it is questionable whether such a provision creates an enforceable
right to dual-enrollment privileges. There may be rare situations where a
statutory denial of such privileges might raise a constitutional problem. Thus,
if a state college admitted part-time students but refused admission to those
who were also taking courses in a sectarian college, such action might be so
arbitrary as to constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.40 "[T] o
exclude religious institutions from the class benefited would probably be
violative of the first amendment as tending to prohibit freedom'41 of worship
and of the due process clause as an unreasonable classification.
Would the situation be any different then, if a science academy, instead
of a sectarian school, offered courses in math, physics, chemistry and biology
in conjunction with a public school? Certainly not; and it could be the case
under a conceivable shared-time provision if such a hypothetical academy
desired to participate. Could there be an allegation of establishment? It is
difficult to admit that secular organizations may participate in shared-time
programs but not religious institutions. This clearly would be a case of the
state preferring non-religion over religion. Would the state not be in fact
hostile to religion under these circumstances? Would it not be the state, then,
which is transgressing the strictures of the first amendment by establishing
a religion of secularism? One will find it difficult to demonstrate that such is
the spirit and the purpose of the Federal Constitution.
Most states have compulsory school attendance laws, but no state may
compel its school age children to attend a public school exclusively. 42 In
1960, there were 2,426 Catholic secondary schools in the United States 48 and
many were facing a financial crisis due to their inability to independently
fund a full curriculum and maintain an adequate staff. Shared-time may be
the only solution for these schools, and without it they might have to close
CONsT. art. 8, § 1.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
41 Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Memorandum on the Impact of the
First Amendment to the Constitution Upon Federal Aid to Education, 50 GEo. L.J. 351,
371 (1961).
42 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The issue in Pierce concerned the
constitutionality of an Oregon Statute which required all school age children to attend
the public school, thus giving the State a monopoly over education itself. In stressing the
right of children to be educated in a non-state institution, the court stated that "[tlhe
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only." Id. at 535.
39 ILL.
40

48

Supra note 27, at 408.
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their doors as educational institutions, and most of their school age adherents
would be forced to attend the public schools. This would mean that some
children "who, in conscience, desired education in a church-related school
'44
would be forced to participate in an education in unacceptable orthodoxies.
So, if the Catholic Church were financially coerced to close its doors to its
students, they would be virtually forced to be inculcated with views hostile
to their religious convictions. There is "coercion upon the child to participate
in schooling, the orientation of which [is] counter to his beliefs-a de facto
'45
denial of free exercise of religion."
If the shared-time program is to be denied, not only must one suspect
interference with the free exercise of religion, but also an establishment of
religion, other than secularism in the public schools. The predication for
this assertion is that the public schools are generally Protestant oriented and
teach Protestant values. Mr. Justice Jackson was aware of this when, in
dissenting in Everson, he observed: "Our public school, if not a product of
Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it than with the Catholic
culture and scheme of values."146 This is not to say that because public education harmonizes with one religion more than another that it is an establishment, but rather, when it compels the attendance of those alien to its dogma,
then it might be so contended.
If any meritorious claim is to be successfully advanced against the permissibility of shared-time, it will not be couched in terms of the first amendment, but rather the objection will be found, if at all, in the construction of
the constitutions and statutes of the various states which would indicate that
'47
the students must attend the public school on an "all or nothing basis.
After the Chicago shared-time experiment was initiated, the precise point
4
was tested in Morton v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago. 8
Specifically, it was claimed that the experimental shared-time program at
the Kennedy High School in conjunction with St. Paul's Roman Catholic
High School was a violation of the Illinois compulsory school attendance
44

Supra note 27, at 439.

45

Supra note 27, at 439.

46 Supra note 10, at 23.
47 LA. REV. STAT. § 17:153 (1951), which provides that "[t]he school boards . . . are
prohibited from entering into any contract, agreement, understanding or combination . . .
with any church ... or association of any religious sect or denomination whatsoever . . .
for the purpose of running any public school . . . together, in connection, or in combination with any private or parochial school." In Special Dist. for Educ. & Training of
Handicapped Children of St. Louis Cty., Mo. v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966), it
was held that Missouri's compulsory attendance laws require students to attend no more
than one school during the school day.
48 69 Ill. App. 2d 38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966).
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laws. 49 The court concluded that "[s]ince the object of the compulsory
attendance law is that all children be educated and not that they be educated
in any particular manner or place, part-time enrollment in a non-public school
is permitted by section 26-1, so long as the child receives a complete education." 50
It may be suggested that a more favorable alternative to shared-time
would be to grant a tax-rebate or voucher for every school aged pupil and
let the parent decide where the child should attend school without incurring
the burden of both taxation and tuition.5 ' By this alternative, it may be possible for the private institutions to become economically nurtured without
direct aid by being able to receive both the voucher and some additional
tuition. The desired result would be that the private institution would be
able to maintain a full curriculum, and at the same time, the intermingling
of the public and parochial school functions would be avoided. "But our
concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional limitations.

' 52

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to see where the system of shared-time is violative of the first
amendment. The benefit accrues directly to the function of secular education.
Nowhere is any sectarian institution given anything; the expenditure goes
directly and exclusively to the function of secular education and is confined
to the public school. It would thus appear that shared-time does not violate
the establishment of religion clause. Shared-time is similar to released-time;
but, it does not incorporate its objectionable feature, that is, at no time must
the public school virtually suspend its operations to the detriment of the
non-participating students in order to accommodate religious inculcation.
Shared-time is not only permissible, but advisable as the best alternative
to direct public aid to parochial education which is clearly proscribed. Without shared-time or an equivalent program, it may be opined that sectarian
education, which is deeply rooted in the American tradition, will become
49 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (1963). "Whoever has custody or control of any
child between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend some public
school in the district wherein the child resides the entire time it is in session during the
regular school term; Provided that the following children shall not be required to attend
the public schools:
1. Any child attending a private or a parochial school where children are taught
the branches of education taught to children of corresponding age and grade in the
public schools, and where the instruction of the child in the branches of education is
in the English language
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50 Supra note 48, at 45.
51 M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 89-98 (1962).
52 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961).

